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    PAUL KRUGMAN    

Bigger
Than
Bush

    As the new Democratic majority pre-
pares to take power, Republicans have
become, as Phil Gramm might put it, a
party of whiners.
     »Some of the whining almost defies be-
lief. Did Alberto Gonzales, the former
attorney general, really say, “I consider
myself a casualty, one of the many casu-
alties of the war on terror”? Did Rush
Limbaugh really suggest that the finan-
cial crisis was the result of a conspiracy,
masterminded    by   that   evil   genius
Chuck Schumer? 
    But most of the whining takes the
form of claims that the Bush adminis-
tration’s failure was simply a matter of
bad luck — either the bad luck of Presi-
dent Bush himself, who just happened
to have disasters happen on his watch,
or the bad luck of the G.O.P., which just
happened to send the wrong man to the
White House.
    The fault, however, lies not in Repub-
licans’ stars but in themselves. Forty
years ago the G.O.P. decided, in effect,
to make itself the party of racial back-
lash. And everything that has happened
in recent years, from the choice of Mr.
Bush as the party’s champion, to the
Bush administration’s pervasive incom-
petence, to the party’s shrinking base,
is a consequence of that decision. 
    If the Bush administration became a
byword for policy bungles, for gover-
nment by the unqualified, well, it was just
following   the   advice   of   leading   con-
servative   think   tanks:   after   the  2000
election the Heritage Foundation specif-
ically urged the new team to “make ap-
pointments based on loyalty first and

__________ The roots of presidential failure go deep. __________

expertise second.”   Contempt for expertise, in turn, rest- ed on contempt for government in gen- eral. “Government is not the solution to our problem,” declared Ronald Reagan. “Government is the problem.” So why worry about governing well?   Where did this hostility to govern- ment come from? In 1981 Lee Atwater, the famed Republican political consul- tant,   explained   the   evolution   of   the G.O.P.’s “Southern strategy,” which originally focused on opposition to the Voting Rights Act but eventually took a more coded form: “You’re getting so ab- stract now you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talk- ing about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is blacks get hurt   worse   than   whites.”   In   other words, government is the problem be- cause it takes your money and gives it to Those People.   Oh, and the racial element isn’t all that abstract, even now: Chip Saltsman, currently a candidate for the chairm- anship of the Republican National Com- mittee, sent committee members a CD including a song titled “Barack the Magic Negro” — and according to some reports, the controversy over his action has actually helped his chances.   So the reign of George W. Bush, the first   true   Southern   Republican   presi- dent since Reconstruction, was the cul- mination of a long process. And despite the claims of some on the right that Mr. Bush betrayed conservatism, the truth is that he faithfully carried out both his party’s divisive tactics — long before Sarah Palin, Mr. Bush declared that he visited his ranch to “stay in touch with real Americans” — and its governing philosophy.   That’s why the soon-to-be-gone ad- ministration’s failure is bigger than Mr. Bush himself: it represents the end of the line for a political strategy that dom- inated the scene for more than a gener- ation.   The reality of this strategy’s collapse has not, I believe, fully sunk in with some observers. Thus, some commenta- tors   warning   President-elect   Barack Obama against bold action have held up Bill Clinton’s political failures in his first two years as a cautionary tale.   But America in 1993 was a very differ- ent country — not just a country that had yet to see what happens when con- servatives control all three branches of government, but also a country in which Democratic control of Congress depend- ed on the votes of Southern conserva- tives. Today, Republicans have taken away almost all those Southern votes — and lost the rest of the country. It was a grand ride for a while, but in the end the Southern strategy led the G.O.P. into a cul-de-sac.   Mr. Obama therefore has room to be bold.   If   Republicans   try   a   1993-style strategy of attacking him for promoting big   government,   they’ll   learn   two things: not only has the financial crisis discredited their economic theories, the racial subtext of anti-government rheto- ric doesn’t play the way it used to.   Will the Republicans eventually stage a comeback? Yes, of course. But barring some huge missteps by Mr. Obama, that will not happen until they stop whining and look at what really went wrong. And when they do, they will discover that they need to get in touch with the real “real America,” a country that is more diverse, more tolerant, and more demanding   of   effective   government than is dreamt of in their political phi- losophy.