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Americans don't want an empire |
ANDREW GREELEY
T he United States of America is a paper tiger. It reverses the dictum of Theodore Roosevelt. It speaks loudly and carries a small stick. Americans are told by their lead- ers that their country is the last superpower in the world, that we have the duty to bring democracy to the rest of the world, that we have the might and the right, the power and the virtue, to impose by ourself our will on the planet. This is rubbish, not to use a more scatological word. The United States is not much good as an imperial power because it lacks two of the qualities essential for ef- fective imperialism: a population that is ready to absorb serious ca- sualties in the cause of the empire and leadership that is sufficiently cynical to abandon moralism when there is a chance to deal. It will do no good to lecture the American people on their obliga- tion to endure substantial loss of life in a cause that the leadership thinks is a national duty. Ameri- cans will rise up in righteous anger if they have been attacked and de- stroy the foe, make no mistake about that -- as the Japanese did in 1941. But they quickly become impatient with the endless, small wars, in which young Americans die without any clear purpose and |
without any "light at the end of the tunnel." That may be immature of Amer- icans, but that's the way we are. We lack the stern moral determi- nation that the Wall Street Jour- nal preaches to us several times a week. We are not exactly pas- sivists, but we are isolationists. We always have been isolationists. Tell us that we must do something about Darfur or Kosovo or Rwanda and we ask: Why us? If the rest of the world is interested in doing something, OK, but don't expect us to go it alone for long. After Korea and Vietnam, that should have been clear. We went along with the Iraq in- vasion because our leaders were able to persuade us that it was a war to punish the Sept. 11 terror- ists when in fact it was about the belief that a "democratic" Iraq
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Wars like Korea and |
cans never voted to become the en- forcers of democracy and justice everywhere in the world all by themselves. Hence, wars like Ko- rea and Vietnam and now Iraq al- ways end badly. After the Great War of 1914 to 1945, the idea of collective security emerged. The nations of the world would band together to protect one another. In practice this meant that the United States protected Western Europe's fragile emergent prosperity from the Russians. That notion has deteriorated into a theory that America is the great policeman of the world, with an oc- casional tiny "coalition of the will- ing" tagging along until the party in a given country that sent troops to Iraq was voted out of power. Iran is not perceived as a threat now, so former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw called our plan to bomb Iran "nutty" -- which it surely is. If the rest of the world, including those most likely to be threatened by fanatical mul- lahs are not concerned, why should Americans be worried? Since 1916 the United States has fought in five wars (excluding the first Iraq war). In each of these conflicts we came to the rescue of others and gained nothing for our- selves. Nor did we receive much gratitude for our efforts. How just those wars were is open to ques- tion. Some probably were, others certainly were not. But they were not self-serving conflicts. Some- how the hubris of power, which seems to possess our leaders every couple of decades, seduces them into conflicts they can never win. They cannot admit to themselves that the world's most powerful country is a paper tiger because its people are not imperialists. |