Presidents don't end wars they start

ANDREW GREELEY

_M uch of the history of the
United States in the last half
century has involved wars
that the country should not
have waged and from which
it could not extricate itself.
In Korea the United States mistak-
enly decided to take on China after
America had won a great military vic-
tory in the legendary landing at In-
chon. If the United States had ended
the war when it drove the commu-
nists out of South Korea, American
casualties would have been light and
the communists humiliated. Unfortu-
nately, General MacArthur made the
terrible mistake of assuming that
China could accept an American
army on its Yalu River boundary.
Hence one can generalize that mis-
taken wars will end only after there is
a change of administrations. Korea
was Harry Truman's war, Vietnam
was Lyndon Johnson's war, and the
Iraq war is George W. Bush's war.
Only when the president who started
the war leaves can this country man-
age to end the war which was identi-
fied with a previous president.
President Eisenhower promised
that if elected he would go to Korea, though that promise was hardly
enough to persuade the Chinese army
to go home. President Nixon had a
"plan" to end the Vietnam war, though
in fact he did not. Although he and
Henry Kissinger messed around in
search for a dignified withdrawal and
caused more U.S. casualties, he (and
President Ford) could finally end the
war that Johnson could not end. It is
clear today Bush cannot (which
means will not) end this most foolish
of the three wars.
Why is it so difficult to extricate
U.S. troops from an impossible situa-
tion?
The commander in chief was in
each case personally responsible for
the decision. Moreover, to rally sup-
port for the decision that in retro-
spect was a serious mistake (underes-
timating the enemy in each case), the
president had to rally the national will
with appeals to patriotism, honor and
American self-interest. His emotional
involvement in "victory" increased as
the casualties did -- and in the case of
Johnson and Bush some kind of iden-
tification with Abraham Lincoln took
place. Finally, the president's political
party resisted the temptation for a
long time to criticize him.
Moreover, a substantial segment of
the American public, especially
Southern and Evangelical, believe
that patriotism demands that the na-
tion emerge clearly victorious no mat-
ter what the price. These people wave
flags, talk about the threat to the
United States (of a much weaker en-
emy) and accept the patriotic appeal
that we simply don't lose wars and we must stand by our troops.
When they are told that we will not
defeat the enemy because we cannot,
they scream defeatism, surrender, be-
trayal. They also suggest that we
should nuke the enemy. The patholog-
ical super patriots always fall back on
the power of nuclear weapons to oblit-
erate the enemy. Those who argue for
withdrawal from an impossible situa-
tion are accused of cowardice and in-
fidelity to our fallen heroes. A sub-
stantial segment of the officer corps
of the military -- mostly out of
harm's way -- become furious, though
they were the ones who provided the
advice on which the war was based.
It would seem, sadly, that we have
learned nothing since the Inchon
landing. A successful imperialist
power (which the United States is not,
cannot and should not ever be) has to
be able to override a public turn
against the conflict. Nor does the
myth of American power, which is in-
deed great but not invincible, espe-
cially against peasant guerrillas,
cause the leadership -- military and
political -- to consider carefully all
the risks of charging off to an easy vic-
tory against weaker opponents.
Indeed those, like Messrs. Bush
and Cheney and Rumsfeld, who ig-
nore the lessons of history are
doomed to repeat its mistakes.
A war will probably not end when
the party whose war it is loses a con-
gressional election. That is not likely
to happen in November anyway be-
cause the fear/patriotism/betrayal
campaign will keep Republicans in
control of Congress.